Our research (N=2,000) revealed that in 2012, 49.3 % of the population in the selected areas covered in this article wanted to live and/or work abroad for some time. This has since not changed but remained relatively stable. Notably, in 2017, another study (N=1,200) found that, despite the change of government and intensified European integration, 44 % of Ukrainians still aspired to work abroad; among people aged 18-35 as many as 54 % wanted to live abroad permanently (Reityng 2017) .
Research on the drivers of international migration typically focuses on macro-level economic, demographic and political drivers (Pedersen et al. 2008) , meso-level factors, such as migration networks (Massey et al. 1998) , or micro-level factors such as rational economic considerations (Borjas 1987) . Meanwhile, individual perceptions, for instance, of such factors remain understudied. However, some older research in Canada found that the public perception of social policy does matter and shapes individual actions (Dobell, Mansbridge 1986: 35) . But with regards to social policy and specifically welfare as a driver of migration, there is a controversy between political economists like Gary Freeman (1986) , who argued that welfare states increase demand for migrant labour and encourage long-term over temporary settlement, and neoclassical theories, which suggest that there is a welfare magnet effect (Borjas 1999; Brueckner 2000) , and empirical studies claiming that the latter assumption cannot be verified (Giulietta 2014) .
The concept of individual perceptions (IPs) has been widely applied in the social sciences, for instance, in studies into how quality of life and inequality are perceived (Plagnol, Scott 2011: 116; Bishop et al. 2014: 27) , IPs and behaviour (Lochner 2007: 445) or risk perceptions (Slovic 2000) . IPs are defined by Stephen Robbins and Tim Judge (2008: 166) as 'processes by which individuals organise and interpret their impressions of reality in order to give meaning to their environment'; they also identify the factors that influence perceptions like expectations, experiences, values etc. IPs are important element in understanding decision-making processes, particularly as to why individuals in similar situations behave differently (Bratton et al. 2007 ). So far, this has rarely been applied to migration studies. Everett S. Lee (1966: 51) is an exception to this. He argued 'it is not so much the actual factors at origin and destination as the perception of these that factors which result in migration'. Jørgen Carling (2002) agrees that the IPs of structural conditions in sending countries explain in important ways the emergence of migration ambitions and subsequent decision-making, even if it is actual capabilities that determine the subsequent moves made in reality. More recently Namrata Chindarkar (2014: 160) and Iryna Lapshyna and Franck Duvell (2015: 305) have made the argument that negative perceptions of the quality of life - economic, social and political parameters - are associated with intentions to emigrate and are thus important drivers of migration.
Further, this article is inspired by James S. Coleman's (1987: 154) model of the nexus between the macro-, meso- and micro-level determinants. It considers first, the micro-level processes of individual perceptions of social policies in Ukraine in comparison to perceptions of social policies in other European countries. Second, it explores to what extent this leads to the emergence of migration aspirations. Third, it studies people's perceptions of migration as a potential solution to their predicament.
The paper is based on the findings of quantitative and qualitative research conducted in Ukraine in 2011/2012 in course of the EU-funded FP7-project Eumagine. Data was conducted in four research areas (RAs): (a) a high emigration area in the West, Zbarazh rayon in Ternopilska Oblast, western Ukraine; (b) a high emigration area in the East, Novovodolaz'ky rayon in Kharkivska Oblast, eastern Ukraine; (c) a low emigration area with comparable socio-economic conditions, Znamyansky rayon in Kirovogradska Oblast, central Ukraine; and (d) a high immigration area, Solomyansky rayon, Kyiv, northern Ukraine. We only studied the age group 18-39, known for being most likely to migrate (e. g. UNO 2011). We conducted a survey of 2,000 people, and 80 in-depth interviews per RA (for methodology and sampling see Ersanili et al. 2011) . The findings are thus not representative for Ukraine but only for the respective areas, although certain conclusions can be drawn for the country as a whole.
Perceptions of socio-economic conditions in Ukraine in comparison to 'Europe'
This section focuses on the perceptions Ukrainians have of the socioeconomic and social-political conditions in their own country in comparison to the perceptions they have of 'Europe' (figure 1).
In Further to this, several respondents were rather pessimistic about the future of Ukraine: 'no-one sees any development for the better ' (41118, Zbarazh RA) .
Our respondents considered economic opportunities ('finding a good job') considerably better in Europe than in Ukraine. Less than ten10 % believed that it is easy to find a good job in Ukraine whilst 33.2 % believed this is the case in Europe: 'wages are low or none; employment is a big problem; isn't that appalling? Besides, the second wave of unemployment is oncoming. This is all dreadful ' (43114, Solomyansky RA) . In addition, the suggestion that it is possible 'getting ahead by working hard' was rejected by the majority, 53.8 % of the respondents. Narratives reinforce that not finding a job was considered the main problem and finding a good job meant a job that generates sufficient revenues. Not unemployment but insufficient salaries were the main theme running through our interviews: 'You can find a job, it's possible, but again, the salary is low. I really work hard, hellish I would say and people work there just for UAH 800, 1,000-1,200 [then €80, 100-120] and this is very little' (42104, Znamyanska RA).
One area people held strong opinions about was social policy and specifically public services. For instance, health care was depicted as insufficient in Ukraine; 69.7 % of the respondents stated that it was bad or very bad: 'Here health service is bad ' (42109, Znamyanska RA) . In contrast, 83.2 % believed that health care in Europe was good or very good. This was partly based on first-hand information circulating within social networks: my cousin lives and works in Germany, <…> he told me [the health system] is on a higher level, dentists' service is cheaper there, <…> he has his medical insurance included in his contract (44118, Novovodolaz'ka RA).
Peoples' perceptions of the education system were more mixed. In total, 37.3 % stated that schools were good or very good in Ukraine but 27 % thought that they were bad or very bad. This diversity can partly be explained with differences between rural and urban schools: 'if we compare a village and a district school, the latter is on a higher level. Kharkov and a village -it is just like heaven and earth ' (44211, Novovodolaz'ka RA ' (41130, Zbarazh RA) . Some respondents were particularly concerned with the future of the younger generation: young people don't have a place in Zbarazh, there is no work for young people; our children hardly see their future in Zbarazh; there is no place in education, in schools, no vacancies in hospitals… it is a problem of the country in general; <…> young people who have just graduated universities cannot get a job (41116, Zbarazh RA).
Also, the fate of the elderly raised similar concerns - old age poverty is common in Ukraine - and thus implicitly relates to their own prospects: 'pensions can cover expenses for medicines, heating, <…> but how to eat, I think it is already a very big issue, pensioners cannot afford any extras ' (41116, Zbarazh RA) .
Generally, conditions in Europe were perceived considerably better. Notably, 69.2 % of women believed that 'life of women in Europe is good or very good', whilst only 16 % believed this is the case in Ukraine. However, due to the recent economic troubles and issues related to discrimination of immigrants a more balanced discourse has emerged and perceptions of Europe were getting more realistic. For instance, 30.6 % believed that 'people from Ukraine who live in Europe are treated badly there'. The younger generation had more nuanced ideas of what to expect, whilst it seems that some of the older generation still had a rather 'rosy image' of the EU, partly stemming from and glorifying past migration experiences. Nevertheless, the following narrative seems to best depict the result of Ukrainians' comparison of their own country with Europe: 'I think it is comfortable for Europeans to live there. <…> They have much higher level and quality of life… The standard of living is much higher there than here. As for Ukrainians, I think it is better there than here ' (41240, Zbarazh RA) .
The respondents in our sample were also extremely critical about their government, local administrations and the state of democracy in Ukraine. Over 70 % disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that 'politicians in Ukraine do what is best for the people'. Simultaneously, they held much higher views of politicians in Europe; only 7.5 % disagreed with the above statement. When we asked for peoples' views on the government's support of poor people, our study revealed that 82.3 % considered that 'the help from the government for poor people' is bad or very bad in Ukraine, compared to only 2 % with regards to Europe.
Finally, the quality of social policy is shaped by corruption and, indeed, the single most widely voiced criticism referred to corruption in Ukraine (see Lapshyna, 2014: 116) : 80.3 % of our respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that 'there is a lot of corruption in Ukraine'. In the view of our respondents: 'there is not a single sphere which would not be infected with corruption' (43111, Solomyansky RA) ; 'it <…> is all over Ukraine ' (41244, Zbarazh RA) . In our qualitative interviews, corruption in Ukraine was described as a widespread, omnipresent, significant and growing problem. In contrast, people considered the level of corruption in Europe as low ( figure 1) ' (42107, Znamyanska RA) .
In all areas, Ukrainians perceived conditions in their own country as rather problematic, a view that was further aggravated by a certain level of hopelessness. Our findings thus illustrate a high level of alienation among our respondents from the social policies of the government (figure 2).
Relation between individual perceptions and migration aspirations
In this part, we analyse whether and how largely negative perceptions of Ukraine are related to the respondents' aspiration to migrate. To test our first hypothesis (that migration aspirations to Europe are associated with people's perceptions of social policies, notably education, health care and benefits) we run a logistic regression analysis. The main response variable in our model is migration aspiration to Europe and the control variables are gender, age, marital status and education. This confirms that all variables are significant and that there are correlations between perceptions of education, health care and benefits in Ukraine and the likelihood to have positive migration aspirations (Table 1 a) . Those who believed that education and health care were bad in Ukraine were 1.83 and 1.86 times more likely to have positive migration aspirations. Our findings reveal that those who believed that education was good in Europe were 0.614 times more likely to have positive migration aspirations. For comparison, we ran a logistic regression for people's views on education and healthcare in Europe. This shows that the variable 'perceptions of education in Europe' is significant and there is a correlation between perceptions of education in Europe and the likelihood of positive migration aspirations. However, the variable 'perceptions of health care in Europe' turned out to be not significant, meaning that there is no correlation between perceptions of healthcare in Europe and the likelihood of positive migration aspirations. This is probably not surprising given that our respondents were at the age where healthcare is given much consideration (Table 1 b.). Another comparative logistic regression for people's views on the government help for poor people in Ukraine and Europe, in other words for social benefits, found that both variables are significant and that there is a correlation between perceptions of such benefits and positive migration aspirations. Those who believed that 'the help from the government for poor people who need it in Ukraine is bad and very bad' were 1.79 times more likely to have positive migration aspirations (table 2 a). Those who believed that 'the help from the government for poor people who need it in Europe' is good and very good were 2.47 times more likely to have positive migration aspirations (table 2 b). Besides, because economic considerations are usually the strongest driver of migration (apart from political conditions in forced migration) we also test whether aspirations to migrate to Europe are related to negative perceptions of the individual financial situation in Ukraine and to positive perceptions of economic opportunities in Europe (table 3) . This also puts into perspective the importance of social policy considerations. Our findings revealed that those who were dissatisfied with their financial situation in Ukraine were 2.64 times more likely to have positive migration aspirations. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: Eumagine data set for Ukraine, 2011. Authors' calculations.
Our third hypothesis is that migration aspirations to Europe are also associated with perceptions of corruption in Ukraine compared to Europe. According to our findings those people who believe that 'there is a lot of corruption in Ukraine' were 1.6 times more likely to have positive migration aspirations compared to those who disagree with this (Table 4 a). Another comparative logistic regression for perceptions on corruption in Europe showed that the odds ratio for those people who disagree that there is a lot corruption in Europe is 2.0; this means that this group is twice as likely to have a positive migration aspiration (Table 4 b ).
Perceptions of migration
Having found that our respondents held rather negative perceptions of conditions in Ukraine and positive perceptions of Europe and having confirmed that these result in a higher propensity to aspiring to migration we still wanted to cross-check how people think about and perceive migration, how they juggle the advantages and disadvantages and whether they believe it is or can be a good or bad strategy to escape their predicament and improve their situation (figure 2). Generally, people have positive perceptions about living and working in Europe. For instance, 57 % agree that it is a good experience for men and 48 % agree that is a good experience for women, whilst only 15.6 % and 21.2 %, respectively, disagree. Therefore, 65.1 % agree that through migration people can improve their human and cultural capital and apply this back home where appropriate. One respondent confirms:
I think everything they do there might be useful in future life. What I know for sure is that if a man goes to work in construction he can later use it, <…> my friend's father went to work in Russia, …he got experience, skills and now he knows how to build (41244, Zbarazh RA).
However, respondents also acknowledge some negative social consequences of migration, notably the impact on family life. A significant proportion, 46.3 %, agrees that 'people who go to live or work in Europe often lose touch with their family' but still 28.2 % of the respondents disagree or strongly disagree. For instance, it was explained that 'it is very often that <…> one goes abroad and leaves a family here, families break up ' (41118, Zbarazh RA ' (41121, Zbarazh RA) .
It is remarkable that in Zbarazh, even though the majority of the respondents thought that people who go to live or work in Europe often lose touch with their family (52 %), 62.2 % would nevertheless go. This implies that perceptions of the benefits of migration outweigh perceptions of the negative consequences.
Finally, we note that some of these beliefs are as much perceptions as they are factors that influence perceptions based on expectations (welfare services), values and attitudes (attached to family). In any case, this sections shows that perceptions of the impact of migration on family life are an important factor counter-balancing social conditions and social policies as drivers of migration.
Subsequent aspirations to migrate
Having analysed the respondents' perceptions of conditions in Ukraine, conditions in Europe and of the perceived advantages and disadvantages of migration and the responses of other family members, we finally analyse in this section the respondents' subsequent aspirations to migrate or stay put. Notably, we asked our respondents whether they 'would go to Europe if somebody gave them the necessary papers'. They were almost equally divided over the question; just under half of the respondents - 49.3 % - were positive and would go whilst 50.7 % were negative and would stay.
There are, however, again significant variations within the total: (1) almost 90 % of the people with migration aspirations would go to Europe and the rest somewhere else, mostly America; (2) even of those people with no migration aspirations 13.8 % would accept to migrate if the opportunity arise, i. e. 'give them the necessary papers', hence, the proportion of those who would go to Europe is even higher, 63.1 %; (3) over 60 % of all respondents in Zbarazh - the high emigration area - would go and thus display an above-average aspiration to migrate; (4) in Znamyanska, the low emigration area, an above-average proportion ' (42206, Znamyanska RA) .
Thus, the response to our survey question was rather reactive, whilst the qualitative interviews illustrate that people would not necessarily take proactive measures. It is, however, relevant to note that 13.8 % of those who do not have any initial migration aspirations - as many as 27 % in Zbarazh - would nevertheless migrate if a concrete offer was made.
Conclusion
Our research identified a complex interplay between (a) the socio-political and economic conditions on the macro-level, (b) peoples' individual perceptions of these conditions, (c) perceptions of migration as a possible response to dissatisfying conditions and (d) the subsequent emergence of people's aspirations to migrate. Our research also found an intricate hierarchy of the significance of individuals perceptions. In particular, our findings suggest that migration aspirations are determined not by mere economic considerations, as conventional theories and analyses often suggest, but by a mix of social political and economic motivations. These combine negative motivations, meaning migrating out of certain critical conditions and positive motivations into certain better conditions. Whereas negative perceptions of economic factors in Ukraine turned out to be the strongest driver of migration aspirations, positive perceptions of benefits in Europe came second, positive perceptions of economic factors in Europe third, positive perceptions of the corruption situation in Europe fourth, negative perceptions of healthcare in Ukraine came fifth followed by negative perceptions of education in Ukraine.
Notably, we found that a combination of negative perceptions of social policy in the country of origin and positive perceptions of social policy in the prospective destination countries - with the exception of healthcare - are a powerful driver of emigration. Whilst this challenges older claims (Piore 1979; Sassen 1988 ) that it is mainly the demand for labour that drives migration and instead suggests the intertwined effect of distraction and attraction, it also rather confirms the often-contested welfare magnet migration hypothesis (e. g. Brueckner 2000) . However, our research implies that the picture is more nuanced in that not all benefits matter equally to all people of any age in any country and that family considerations are a powerful set-off, which can hold people back from migration.
